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Unsurprisingly, the exchange of commerciallysensitive information between competitors canresult in the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition under Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – it often
makes complex markets transparent, limits incentives to
deviate, and increases the ability to monitor. The existence
of an anti-competitive object and an anti-competitive
effect of an agreement or a concerted practice are
alternative conditions for determining the application of
Article 101. Usually infringement by object occurs where
certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be
regarded by their very nature to be detrimental to the
proper functioning of normal competition. Importantly,
once an anti-competitive object has been established, it is
no longer necessary to verify whether the concerted
practice also had any effects on the market, which is cost
efficient for the competition authorities.
This article considers which circumstances constitute an
infringement of Article 101 by object. It also sets out the
recent attempts to clarify this sophisticated issue of
information exchanges between competitors, and provides
a description of the European Commission’s success and
the European Court of Justice’s failure to assist businesses
with developing compliance strategies.
TYPES OF INFORMATION
The types of information exchanged between
competitors are crucial in assessing the risks of potential
fines being imposed on a company and its directors being
disqualified for the infringement of competition law.
Under paragraph 81 of the draft guidelines on the
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-
operation agreements, Brussels, SEC(2010) 528/2
(“horizontal guidelines”), the exchange of commercially
sensitive data between competitors is more likely to violate
Article 101 than exchanges of other types of information.
Sharing of strategic data can give rise to restrictive effects
on competition if it reduces the parties’ decision-making
independence by decreasing their incentives to compete.
Strategic information can be related to prices, customer
lists, production costs, quantities, turnover, sales,
capacities, qualities, marketing plans, risks, plans,
investments, technologies, research and development
programs and results.
In the Commission decision 92/157/EEC on the UK
Tractors case – useful in classifying the types of information
exchanged between competitors – eight manufacturers and
importers of agricultural tractors exchanged, over an
extended period of time, some historical sales data. This
decision was appealed, and the Court of First Instance
(CFI), now called the General Court, ruled that the
information exchange system regarding historical sales data
had an anti-competitive effect. This case is helpful,
therefore, in ascertaining what types of information
exchanges should not of themselves constitute an
infringement by object under Article 101.
Information sharing does not have to be an isolated event – it
may also form part of a hard-core cartel or a wider arrangement
such as standardisation agreements. The information itself can
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be classified as: individualised/aggregated, private/public,
future/current/historic, and regarding pricing/quantity/cost/other.
CASE LAW PRIOR TO T-MOBILE
Before T-Mobile Netherlands BV and others v Raad van
bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit C-8/08, ECR
I-4529, only arrangements or practices that restrict
competition “by their very nature” were considered as
object cases. In object cases anticompetitive effects would
arise “as a necessary consequence” of the agreement or
practice (Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development
Society Ltd, Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd C-209/07).
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated in Irish Beef
that the parties’ intentions were not relevant to whether
the object of the scheme was to restrict competition.
As mentioned before, an exchange of information may
form part of a cartel. For example, in the Commission
decision of October 15, 2008 in the bananas case
COMP/39188 the pre-pricing communications took place
before quotation prices were set by competitors (banana
suppliers). Then, after setting their quotation prices on
Thursday mornings the parties bilaterally exchanged them.
The European Commission considered that even if only
one party revealed its pricing intentions during exchanges
of information, such communication constitutes a
concerted practice with an anticompetitive object. The
Commission found that such an exchange of quotation
prices forms an element of the parties’ cartel
arrangements, which have as their object the restriction of
competition.
The Commission is not the only competition authority
with the power to apply Article 101. Since May 1, 2004
when Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 entered into
force (Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L1/1) national
competition authorities and national courts of EU Member
States are required to apply and enforce, inter alia, Article
101. For instance, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
investigated several cases regarding the disclosure of future
pricing intentions. In Independent Schools (the OFT
decision CA98/05/2006 of November 20, 2006) the OFT
held that the exchange of future fees information between
independent schools was anticompetitive by “object”. The
exchanged information related to future intentions, was
confidential, and not publicly available. The information
exchange took place on a regular, highly systematic basis
for a number of years. Interestingly, the timing of the
exchange corresponded with the time when school fees
were set. The independent schools infringed the
prohibition (“the Chapter I prohibition”) imposed by
section 2(1) of the Competition Act 1998 which is an
English law equivalent of Article 101. The Chapter I
prohibition reflects both the structure and the precise
wording of Article 101(1) and (3).
T-MOBILE – A TURNING POINT?
As was mentioned by Christian Ahlborn at his
presentation at the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, October 6, 2010, “A Random Walk
between Luxembourg and Brussels”, the recent ECJ
judgment in T-Mobile is highly controversial as it drastically
expands the definition of an anti-competitive object. The
ECJ was asked how Article 101 should be applied in a
situation where the representatives of five operators
providing mobile telecommunications services in the
Netherlands met on one occasion, and exchanged
confidential information about their intentions to reduce
standard dealer remunerations for postpaid subscriptions.
The court stated that this conduct falls foul of Article
101(1) as a restriction of competition by object, and
examined some controversial criteria for establishing
whether concerted action has an anti-competitive object.
Notably, the ECJ ruled that to determine whether a
concerted practice has an anti-competitive object, close
regard must be paid to its objectives, and its economic and
legal context. In arriving at this and other conclusions the
ECJ relied heavily on Advocate General Kokott’s opinion.
AG Kokott, after reviewing the case law on the anti-
competitive object, noted that the subjective intentions of
the parties are indicative. Subsequently, in contrast to Irish
Beef, the parties’ intention is one factor which can be taken
into account. This statement is highly debatable as an
expected effect on competition should matter rather than
the parties’ intention. In the view of the jurisprudence,
conduct in competition law should not be penalized by
reference to intention. For instance, it should not matter
that the members of a hard-core cartel did not intend to
create one.
The ECJ ruled that: “a concerted practice pursues an anti-
competitive object for the purposes of Article 101(1) TFEU
where (...) it is capable in an individual case of resulting
in the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market (...).” The court’s approach
creates additional uncertainty in an already complex area as
the court’s language makes it impossible to assess the
lawfulness of information sharing in a given factual scenario.
If any practice that is “capable of (...) distorting (...)
competition as such” falls in the “restriction by object”
category, hypothetically nearly every information sharing will
be regarded as unlawful unless the parties can present a
plausible efficiency defence under Article 101(3). This
wording would not leave any room for effects cases.
Furthermore, the ECJ noted that an exchange of information
between competitors which is capable of removing
uncertainties between market participants as regards the
timing, extent and details of modifications to prices must be
regarded as pursuing an anti-competitive object. Defining
object infringement by reference to uncertainty is, however,
often severely criticised by jurisprudence, and regarded as
inappropriate as all information exchanges result in the
reduction of uncertainty. 7
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T-Mobile potentially opens a Pandora’s box – the broad
categorisation of exchanges of information described above
as an infringement by object may cause havoc. National
competition authorities, with limited resources, may
cherry pick only the object infringement cases, which are
less work intensive and, therefore, cheaper than the effect
infringement cases. Furthermore, if almost all information
exchanges capable of restricting competition were
regarded as an infringement by object, this would
considerably lower the standard of proof and result in a
vast number of Type I errors. Type I errors occur where
firms do not engage in certain activities, even though some
may provide benefits, because the firms are not in a
position to carry out complex economic analysis for every
individual situation. In other words, a case-by-case
approach runs the risk of cooling beneficial firm activity,
and subsequently is often detrimental to a competitive
economy. That would obviously not be the best outcome
for consumers and interested parties, and would not result
in the effective enforcement of competition law.
UNILATERAL DISCLOSURES
A unilateral disclosure of future prices to competitors
may constitute an infringement of Article 101 by object.
In the CFI case of July 12, 2001, Tate & Lyle plc, British Sugar
plc and Napier Brown & Co Ltd v Commission, joined cases T-
202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 [2001] ECR II-2035, a
meeting had taken place between representatives of British
Sugar and its competitor Tate & Lyle, at which British
Sugar announced the end of the price war on the UK
industrial and retail sugar markets. That meeting was
followed, up to and including June 13, 1990, by 18 other
meetings concerning the price of industrial sugar, at which
the representatives of two leading sugar merchants were
also present. At those meetings, British Sugar gave
information to all the participants concerning its future
prices. The CFI observed that “the fact that only one of
the participants […] reveals its intentions is not sufficient
to exclude the possibility of an agreement or concerted
practice.”
The court referred to Rhône-Poulenc v Commission T-1/89
[1991] ECR II-867, in which the applicant had been
accused of taking part in meetings at which information
was exchanged among competitors including prices which
they intended to adopt on the market. The CFI held in
Rhône-Poulenc that an undertaking, by its participation in a
meeting with an anti-competitive purpose, not only
pursued the aim of eliminating uncertainty about the
future conduct of its competitors but could not fail to take
into account, directly or indirectly, the information
obtained in those meetings. Subsequently, the Court of
First Instance in Tate & Lyle plc, British Sugar plc and Napier
Brown & Co Ltd v Commission, joined cases T-202/98, T-
204/98 and T-207/98 [2001] ECR II-2035, considered
that the Rhône-Poulenc conclusion also applies where, as in
this case, the participation of one or more undertakings in
meetings with an anti-competitive purpose is limited to the
mere receipt of information concerning the future conduct
of their market competitors.
The OFT recently investigated the sharing of generic as
well as specific confidential, future pricing information by
the Royal Bank of Scotland to Barclays of which the latter
took account in determining its own pricing (OFT press
release 34/10 of March 30, 2010). This case involved a
unilateral disclosure of future pricing intentions, from one
competitor to another. Such disclosures can amount to a
concerted practice which has as its “object” the restriction
of competition in circumstances where that information is
“at the very least” accepted by the recipient (see Tate & Lyle
v Commission).
INDIRECT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN COMPETITORS
Information sharing can infringe Article 101 even if
there is no direct exchange between competitors. The
OFT has investigated several cases involving “hub-and-
spoke” arrangements regarding the exchange of
commercially sensitive information through third parties,
for instance from one retailer to another through their
supplier. Following the English Court of Appeal’s
judgments in Argos Ltd/Littlewoods v OFT [2006] EWCA Civ
1318 and Umbro Holdings Ltd v OFT and JJB Sports v OFT
[2006] EWCA Civ 1318, it is necessary to prove the
knowledge of the parties and the context of the exchange.
On April 25, 2008 the OFT issued a statement of
objections alleging that two tobacco manufacturers
(Imperial Tabacco and Gallaher) and 10 retailers engaged
in unlawful practices in relation to retail prices for tobacco
products in the UK. The OFT found that the infringing
agreements were, by their very nature, capable of
restricting competition and therefore had an anti-
competitive object in breach of the Chapter I prohibition.
The alleged infringements included indirect exchange of
proposed future retail prices between competitors: for
example, Sainsbury’s to Tesco via Imperial Tobacco,
Imperial Tobacco to Gallaher via Asda and Imperial
Tobacco to Gallaher via Shell (OFT press release 82/08 of
July 11, 2008). Interestingly the exchange of information
between competitors took place via a third party.
There are similar cases in the US. For instance, in the
US Airline Tariff Publishing Company 1994-2 Trade Case
(CCH) 61, 659 (ED Pa 1977), eight of the largest US
airlines used a computer reservation system to disseminate
actual and intended fare information through travel agents.
The system allowed the airlines to view competitors’ actual
fares and to post future fare intentions which other airlines
could see without having to implement them.
Consequently, the information sharing between
competitors allowed firms to agree on focal prices, and to
monitor any understanding achieved through the
disclosure of actual prices. The Department of Justice8
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obtained a consent decree which barred airlines from
continuing to exchange the information.
COMMISSION GUIDELINES
Paragraph 42 of the guidelines on the application of
Article 81 of the EC Treaty (now Article 101 TFEU) to
maritime transport services (Official Journal C245, p 2,
2008/09/26, Notice 2008/C245/02) states that an
exchange of information may have in itself the object of
restricting competition. They refer to the ECJ judgment in
the case of Commission v Anic Partecipazioni, Case C-49/92 P,
[1999] ECR I-4125, 1999/07/08, paragraphs 121 to 126.
The court ruled that, subject to proof to the contrary, there
must be a presumption that the undertakings participating
in concerting agreements and remaining active on the
market take account of the information exchanged with
their competitors. The Commission found that Anic had
infringed Article 101(1) by participating in an agreement
and concerted practice by which the producers supplying
polypropylene contacted each other and secretly met
regularly over a long period where they, inter alia,
exchanged detailed information on their deliveries. The
Commission ordered the undertakings to terminate any
exchange of information of the kind normally covered by
business secrecy and to ensure that any scheme for the
exchange of general information excludes any information
from which the behaviour of specific producers could be
identified. This concerted practice falls under present
Article 101(1) even in the absence of anti-competitive
effects on the market. The court noted that concerted
practices are prohibited, regardless of their effect, when
they have an anti-competitive object.
The draft horizontal guidelines set out the
Commission’s position on the information exchange.
Pursuant to Paragraph 68 of the guidelines “information
exchanges between competitors of individualised data
regarding intended future prices or quantities should ... be
considered a restriction of competition by object within
the meaning of Article 101(1)”. This wording implies that
a unilateral public disclosure of future pricing is not treated
as an object infringement.
Information regarding “intended future quantities”
could include future sales, market shares, territories, or
customer lists. The guidelines provide an example of a
restriction by object, namely exchange of “intended future
prices.” In this example, a trade association of coach
companies in country X disseminates individualised
information on intended future prices to the member
coach companies. The information contains: the intended
fare, the route to which the fare applies, the possible
restrictions to this fare (ie which consumers can buy it), the
period during which tickets can be sold for the given fare,
and the time during which the ticket can be used for travel.
An infringement by object under Article 101 also occurs
in the case of information exchanges on current conduct
that reveal intentions on future behaviour, and in the cases
where the combination of different types of data enables
the direct deduction of intended future prices or
quantities. There may be other types of information
exchanges, which would normally be considered as
infringements by object, for example private individualised
exchanges between competitors on prices and market
share. These types of information exchanges run the risk
of being fined as cartels. If there is a hard-core cartel,
ancillary information exchanges will be subject to the same
assessment and fines.
CONCLUSIONS
Case law clearly states that the sharing of disaggregated,
confidential information on future intentions between
competitors constitutes an infringement of Article 101 by
object. This information can be unilaterally disclosed to
competitors, disclosed through a third party or simply
exchanged between competitors to result in an infringement
by object. The exchange of information can take place over
a longer period of time or only once to amount to the object
infringement. Information sharing can also form a part of a
wider arrangement, for example a cartel arrangement. As a
warning for wrongdoers, even the mere participation in a
meeting with competitors, where sensitive information
regarding future prices has been unilaterally disclosed, may
result in an infringement of Article 101 by object (see
Rhône-Poulenc case). The ECJ’s finding in T-Mobile that a
one-off exchange of information at a single meeting falls
foul of Article 101(1) as a restriction of competition by
object, is also a cause of concern.
Because case law is unclear in delineating infringement
by object and by effect, especially after the recent T-Mobile
derailment by the ECJ, the Commission’s horizontal
guidelines can be found helpful. They categorise exchange
of information on future prices and output as a “restriction
by object”. Delineating infringements on the basis of
whether the disaggregated information on future prices
and output is exchanged in private (object infringement) or
in public (effect infringement) may further reduce legal
uncertainty. In conclusion, some types of information
exchanges should of themselves be considered as:
infringement by object (ie future disaggregated confidential
information on prices/output), infringement by effect (ie
disaggregated historical or current information on sales on
a highly concentrated oligopolistic market), or as non-
infringement (ie historic public aggregated information).
There are also grey areas. As the guidelines and case law
do not contribute to shrinking them, further clarification is
needed.
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